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This is one of a series of Occasional Papers stemming from the
inquiry into long-term trends in capital formation and financing
in the United States initiated at the National Bureau in mid-1950.
The project is supported by a generous gTant from the Life Insur-
ance Association of America.
In this inquiry the study of financial intermediaries, i.e. insti-
tutiolis engaged in investing funds mobilized from a large number
of individual and other savers, is of strategic importance. The
various sector studies that examine trends in the accumulation of
real capital and other assets, and the ways such accumulation was
financed - in agriculture, mining, manufacturing, the public utili-
ties, residential real estate, government, and the foreigii sector -
are designed to shed light on the factors that determined demand
for capital funds either in the domestic economy or abroad. We
are also fortunate to have at hand Dr. Goldsmith's recently coin-
pleted estimates of savings in this country since 1897 by groups
of savers and the forms that savings assumed, which will l)e pub-
lished shortly in Volume I of his work, A StudyofSaving in the
United States by the Princeton University Press. Clearly, how-
ever, a statistical and analytical bridge is needed between the flow
of savings on the supply side and the use of such savings in financ-
ing capital formation and other expenditures by capital users.
We need to determine channels through which savings originating
with certain groups in the economy flowed into certain sectors of
capital formation or other uses. In drawing such lines of connec-
tion, we must obviously give full consideration to the role of
financial intermediaries - in mobilizing savings and channeling
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them into suchuses in the economy as assure the purposes ofsav- ings- from the standpoint of both the savers and theeconomy
at large. In such consideration the volumeof assets handled bythe
VariOus linancial intermediaries,and their trends, either bytype or in their distributionamong the various financialintermediaries and in relationto the long-term movements in theeconomy at large, must all heascertained. Dr. Goldsmithcovers this topic,
among others, in detail ina forthcoming monograph. Theresults of his investigationare brought together, in greatlyabbreviated form, in thepresent paper.
Before weventure a few commentson Dr. Goldsmith's suh
stantive findings,a brief statement about the place ofthese findings in the inquiryas a whole is in order. Demand forfunds can origi- nate either in the need forcapital goods or forcurrent consunip tion; governments'need for the latter, forinstance, is particularly large in wartime. Thisdemand can be satisfiedeither by borrow- ing, i.e. byexternal financing,or by a draft on theunit's own accumulated stock of claimson current income, i.e. byinternal financing. Inturn, external financingcan take place either di- rectly, e.g. wherefunds are providedwithout interventionby a financial intermediaryas when an individualpurchases a newly issued bondor share in an enterprise,or when he lends hissavings directly tosome industrial firm. Butmuch external financingof capital formationor of other uses of fundstakes place through financial intermediariesIt is importantto remember that inthis paper Dr. Goldsmith's
estimates, presented insuch rich detail in the text, relate onlyto the part of the flowof savings intocapital formation and otheruses that is channeledfrom saversto users through interme1iariesMeasures of leveland trends in theother types of financingare clearly needed inthe inquiryas a whole; and it is hopedthat they can beapproximated, althouohthe ob- stacles in theway are formidableand compronhisesmay have to he made.
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The variety offinancial intermediaries,about whichDr. Gold- smith's papercontains a mine ofstatistical information,is rich
2indeed: banks ranging from the Federal Reserve institutions to
the commercial and savings banks; insurance companies of various
descriptions; private sef-ailministc-red pension funds and govern-
ment pension, retirement, and Social Security funds; the persoiial
trust departments of banks; and the miscellaneous group compri s-
ing savings and loan associations, mortgage COmpanies, credit
unions, investment companies of various types, and government
lending institutions. The variety occurs because (1) savers make
funds available under different conditions; (2) the various finan-
cial intermediaries specialize in different types of assets or claims,
and this, in turn, gives rise to important differences in the uses to
which funds can be put; (3) the intermediaries differ in charac-
ter: they may be private or governmental, designed for general
service or attached to a special group of enterprises. The necessary
differentiation of financial intermediaries, together witha mini-
mum classification of their assets by form - government securities;
corporate bonds, domestic or foreign; corporate stocks, domestic
or foreign; mortgages, cash, short-term claims in the form of notes
and loans of various types - present a diversified picture. This
variety and complexity are, of course, a reflection of the system's
functional significance- of the service that it renders in mobiliz-
ing savings from various sources and under different conditions
and channeling them into the economically most desirable uses.
And even though Dr. Goldsmith found it possible to present his
series of estimates only at selected benchmark dates within the
fifty-year period that he covers, the wealth of statistical information
thus assembled is impressive.
It might help orient the reader amidst this embarrassment of
statistical riches to present briefly Dr. Goldsmith's major findings
on two topics: (1) the level and trends in the shaies of all financial
intermediaries in some comprehensive total of all assets in the
economy and (2) the level and trends in the distribution of assets
of all financial intermediaries among the major groups.
As Dr. Goldsmith rightly stresses, a central difficulty in estab-
lishing the share of financial intermediaries in some countrywide
total is that of duplication. The assets held by the intermediaries
may be either tangible goods or claims of various description
34
long_ arid short-tei-in, fixed debt claims and equity shares,clain
against private Units and claims againstgovernment. There is
auplication among these assets in the sCnsc that the CIZIIIUSliel(1
by gnup of financial intermediaries niay be against othet
illterniediaries, e.g. the assets adniiuistcrcd by persotialtrust de-
partinents may inclu(le bank stocks. When we try toestablisha
countrywide total of assets, (luJ)hicatioli will be all themore exten-
sive in that tangible goods,e.g. industrial l)1a111S and Cqtlipmncnt,
will be included, together withthe corporate bonds and stocks
which constitute claims against theincome (lerived from the use of
plants andequipment. The share of financial intennediai-icsin
Toble A
Shares of Financial Intermediariesin Several Totals of Assets
Selected Dates,1900-1949
1All assets
2Intangible assets (all claims)
SIntangible assets, excluding cashand short
terni (all long-term claims)




6Private fixed long-termintangibles (bonds
an l mortgages)
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2Intangible assets (all claims)
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5Private long-terni intangibles(bonds,
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47 '18 73 72
28 32 -14 47
'15 52 68 77any countrywide total of assets will, therefore, necessarily depend
upon the aniount of duplication permitted in both the numerator
and denominator of the fraction which measures that share.
Since it is doubtful that even with the bcst of feasible data a
unique net ratio could be calculated except upon some artificial
and highly restrictive assumptions, it seemed best to operate with
a variety of countrywide totals and of resulting ratios or shares.
Table A provides a brief summary of a few of such possible totals
and shares, selected out of the wealth of data provided in Dr. Gold-
smith's paper, with the estimates shown at as few dates as necessary
in order to reveal the major trends during the last half century.
The first countrywide total of assets shown is the most inclusive
and duplicated of all: it comprises all the tangible goods, the real
wealth of the country, and also all the intangible assets -- the overt
debt claims, whether in the form of bonds, stocks, mortgages, notes,
receivables, or cash. Of this total, the share of financial intermedi-
aries has in the last fifty years ranged from about a ninth to some-
what over a fifth.
But it is clear that in this countrywide total, used in the de-
nominator, duplication is relatively much greater than in the total
of assets of financial intermediaries, used in the numerator. The
denominator includes all tangible goods together with all the
intangibles, the claims against the income and principal of these
goods. Financial intennediaries hold few tangible goods: by defini-
tion they are specialists in the handling of money savings and
clauns. It is, therefore, more meaningful to compare their assets,
reduced by these minor amounts of tangible goods, with the
countrywide total of all claims or intangible assets. This is the
rationale for the second countrywide total in Table A, that of all
intangible assets or claims (line 2). The share of financial inter-
mediaries in this total is found to range from not much under a
fourth to a bit under two-fifthsalmost twice as great as their
share in the more duplicated first total.
The total of intangible assets also contains duplication, and a
fairly significant one, between long- and short-term claims - e.g.
between bank stock (a claim upon the bank) and the bank's re-
ceivables or cash. And again the duplication in the countrywide
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total used as denominator is likelyto be greater than in the total
for financial intermediariesused in the numerator. Manyfinancial
intermediaries (Jo not deal in short-term claims, and their cash
assets are quite small comparedto their holdin5 of bug-term
claims, Hence thenext Step (line 3 of Table A) in whichwe con- fine the countrywidetotal to intangible assets of long-termchai-ac- Let -. bonds, stocks, andmortgages. Unfortunately, Dr.Gold-
smith's data do not permitdifferentiation between short- andlong-
term governnent securities;although in thiscase, unlike the case
of private credit, thedistinction is not as significantin reflecting largely differenttypes of capital formation. Short-termgovernment notes are therefore includedin the total of all long-termclaims or intangibles; and, withall its limitations, theresulting total is fairly useful ifone admits the validity ofa rough distinction be- tween short- andlong-term claimsor intangibles. Of thistotal, the share of all linancialintermediaries ranges fromtinder a third to almost six-tenths- consistently larger than their sharein the countrywide total of all intangibleassets.
The three remainingtotals in Table Aare variants derivedas we either omit long-termintangible assets in theform of equity shares and thus limitthe total to fixeddebt claims (totalin line 4), or include theformer but omit allgovernment securities, thus limiting the totalto private long-termintangibles (bonds,stocks, and mortgages,total in line 5),or omit bothcorpol-atiozi stocks and governrnezitsecurities and limitthe total to privatefixed long-term debt (totalin line 6). Therelevance of thesevariants needs little explanation.The financialintermediaries formany reasons participate less inthe holding ofstock than ofa more fixed type of claim; andthe markedfluctuations in theprices of stocks complicate the problemof comparatirevaluation inany esti- mated total ofassets or claims (onereason why Dr.Goldsmith's estimates for 1929,a year of exceedinglyinflated stockvalues, were not used). Hence the share of financial
intermediaries in the total,except for stocks, isgreater than in thetotal of all long- term intangibles,ranging froma half to aboutthree-quarters (com- pare lines 4 and 3). Thereinclusion ofstocks in the totalin line 5 and the exclusionofgovernment securities(widely held byfinan-
6cial intermediaries) naturally results in a decline in the share of
intermediaries in the countrywide total of all private long-term
debt - the share ranging from 28 to 47 per cent. Finally, the ex-
clusion of stocks and of government securities results again in a
high share of financial intermediaries in the countrywide total of
all private Fixed long-term debt - ranging from not much over
two-lifths to about four-fifths (line 6)
A most significant finding of Dr. Goldsmith, indicated clearly
in Table A, is that despite marked differences in thelevel of shares
of financial intermediaries in the alternativecountrywide totals of
assets or claims, the major trendsin the shares are quite similar.
In all the lines of the lower panel of Table A the shares offinan-
cial intermediaries rise from 1900 to 1949 and quite substantially:
if they nearly double only in some, itis because in others the
shares in 1900 are already at such high levelsthat doubling is
arithmetically almost impossible. In all lines in Table A the up-
ward trend in the shares of Financial intermediaries inthe country-
wide totals of assets is more pronounced from 1922 to 1949than
from1900 to 1922, and the difference is marked in most cases.
Finally, in comparing the periods 1922-1939 and 1939-1949, one
can see immediately that the rise inthe shares of financial inter-
mediaries in the economy was much steeper from 1922 to 1939
than from 1939 to 1949 - even allowing for the fact thatthe first
interval is seventeen and the second only ten years long.
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The combination, just observed, of differencesin the level of
shares of financial intermediaries in the severalcountrywide totals
of assets, with the similarity in the trends in these shares over
time - the finding that the shares of intermediaries in country-
wide totals of assets rose from 1900 to 1949, the rise being most
conspicuous from 1922 to 1939 - may assume more interestand
significance as we observe the distribution of assets amongthe
major groups of financial intermediaries proper.A minimum
amount of information on suchdistribution is provided, for the
same selected dates, in Table B.
7TA8LE B
Percentage Distributions of Total Assets among Major Groups of Financial
Intermediaries for Various Asset Totals, Selected Dates, 1900-1949
2 Intangible, long-termassets (bonds,
stocks, mortgages)
3 Fixed long-term (bonds andmortgages)
4 Private long-term intangibles
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I Total assetsa 1QW 1g22 1939 19-19
a)Banking system 69 63 50 53
b)Insurance system 12 12 22 28
c)Personal trust departments 16 19 18 12
d)Miscellaneous 4 5 10 8
e)Private sector ioo 93 82 77
1)Government, total 0 7 18 23
Banking o 6 14 14
Insurance 0 3 9
a)Banking system 46 42 35 42 b)Insurance system 18 19 28 36 c)Personal trust departments 29 31 25 15 d)Miscellaneous 6 8 12 7 c)Private sector 100 98 88 80 f)Government 0 2 12 20
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48The percentage shares for the total of all intangibles would be almost identical.
The classification of intermediaries follows that given in much
greater detail in Dr. Goldsmiths paper (see particularly page 19)
All that need be added here is that the government classification
includes the Federal Reserve and Postal Savings Systems, the vari-
ous trust accounts for icmisions, retirements, Social Security, and
other government lending institutions.
The table shows the distributions for the several totals of claims
differentiated in Table A. The distinction between the total of all
assets and the total of intangible assets alone has been omitted;
because the amount of tangibles held by financial intermediaries
is minute in relation to their holdings of claims, the distributions
of the two totals would be aimnost identical.
Since despite much simplification the lindings are still numerous
and complex, it is best to list them:
1. The shares of the banking system in the assets of all inter-
mediaries differ largely as we include or exclude short-term assets
and cash: with their inclusion the shares of the banking sector are
appreciably higher than with their exclusion. Of much more in-
terest, because less familiar, are the differences in the trends in
the shares of the banking system in the different totals of assets.
If we deal with all intangible assets, the share of the banking sys-
tem declines perceptibly from 68 per cent in 1900 to 53 in 1949;
and the decline is more marked after 1922, particularly in the
period from 1922 to 1939 (line la) .If we exclude short-term
claims (except the governmental) ,the downward trend in the
share of the banking system in the assets of financial intermediaries
disappears: it moves from 46 per cent in 1900 with some fluctua-
tions to 42 in 1949 (line 2a) or, with exclusion of corporate stocks,
from 50 per cent in 1900 to 47 in 1919 (line 3a) . Finally, if we
exclude government securities as well as short-term claims, the
share of the banking system in the assets of all mterniedianes again
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c)Personal trust departments 29 22 19 6
d)Miscellaneous 9 14 21 18
c)Private sector 100 100 92 98
1)Government 0 0 8 2declines, either from38 j1900 to 21 in 1949 (line4a) or with
exclusion of corporatestocks, from 41 in 1000to 28 in 1949 (line
5a). Again, the decline is most apparent from1922 to 1939.Ob- viously, the holdingof government securitiessustained the bank-
ing system's shareiu the total of all long-termassets held by finan- cial intermediaries.
The share of theinsurance inStitUtIOnS in theassets of all intermediaries rises- in all variants of the asset totalsused in Table B. This risewas mild, if present at all,between 1900and 1922 and reallyperceptible only after1922. in allvariants the rise in the shareof the insurancesystem was as greator almost as great from 1939to 1949 as it was from1922 to 1939indeed in most cases, withallowance for thedifferent lengths ofthe two peuiods. greaterduring the lastten years than duringthe seven- teen years from1922 to 1939.However, this latterfInding would not be true for theshare of theprivate insurancegroup in the totals ofassets includinggovernment securities:in such totals, which includeassets held by thegovernment insurancesector, the shares of privateinsurance wouldnot rise markedlyfrom 1939to 1949, and the risewould thereforebe largely confinedto the inter- 'aI 1922-1939.
The share ofpersonal trustdepartments in theassets held by all financialintermediaries declinesover the period inall variant totals ofassets. In most variantsthe decline inthe share isparticu- largely perceptiblefor the decade1939-1949. The share ofthe miscellaneousgroup (dominatedby build- ing and loanassociations and inlater yearsinfluenced alsoby the government lendinginstitutions) risesin almost allthe alternative totals of assetsheld by financialintermediaries- but not in those that excludeshort-term claimsand includegovernment securities. The exclusionof the formerremoves acomponent whose total weight in allassets held byfinancialintermediariesdeclines; and since themiscellaneousgroup holds few ofsuch short-termclaims, its share ina total wouldnot rise as muchif the totalexcludes a decreasingcomponent of short-termclaims. Nordoes the miscel- laneous grouphold much ofgovernment securities;the inclusion of the latterinto a totalof assets, witha rising weight,has a de-
10pressing effect on the share of the miscellaneous intermediaries.
5. In general in the alternative totals of assets held by all in-
terrrlc(liaries, the share of the government group tends to rise and
that of the private group to decline. But the participation o the
government sector is largely in the holding of government se-
curities. Hence when we observe shares in totals including such
securities (lines if,21, 3f) ,the upward trend in the shares of
government is quite marked. In the totals of long-term assets
alone, the rise in the shares of the government sector is particu-
larly conspicuous after 1922- but not before then (lines 2f and
. Butif we deal with totals of private long-term claims alone,
government intermediaries cease to play a significant role; and
while there is an increase in their shares in 1989 (lines 4 and 5)
in connection with bailing out operations of the government lend-
ing agencies, the share dwindles again to insignificance by 1949.
The findings noted above arc hut a few of the many more that can
he derived from the two summary tables, let alone from the variety
of information provided in Dr. Goldsmith's paper. One need not
stress their relevance to the understanding of the processcs by
which savings are channeled into capital formation and other uses,
and of the major changes in these processes over the last hall
century.
Despite their apparent complexity, the findings can, I believe,
be reduced to a few underlying trends; it is the combination of
these trends with different weights in different periods that pro-
duces the somewhat bewilderingly complex picture of changes in
shares of financial intermediaries in the total assets of the economy
and in the structure of the system of financial intermediaries
proper. The underlying trends stem from factors which determine
the growing importance of security as a motivation for savings as
compared with other motives for savingssuch as expansion of
one's own business. This is reflecEed in the marked growth of in-
stirance institutions among the intermediaries and in turn con-
11tributes to a rise in the share of intermediaries inthe totalassets 0the economy. Another set of forces affects thepoSjtiO11 ofthe upper income groups, whose savings presLnnabi'
COflStjtfltthe hulk of funds handled through personaltrust (lepartmc5Th decline since 1939 in the share ofupper incomegroupsfltotal national income may have contributedto the markeddecline in the share of personal trust departmentsin theassets of aflilan cial intermediaries, and partlyto the fact that theshare of all
intermediaries in the various totals ofassets failed to risemarkedly from 1939 to 1949. A thirdset of forces accounted for
changes in the structure of all intangibleassets or claims. A shiftaway from short-term and toward long-termclaims woul(l, allother condi- tions equal, tend to raise theshare of financialintermediaries in the totals of allassets; and it is perhapsno accident that thegreat- est rise in that share occurred from1922 to 1939- the period in lvll icli short-term claiins showed least growthas compared with long-term intangibles,particularly fixed debt.The sameshift would also affect the distributionof assets amongfinancial inter. mediaries, Presumably depressingthe shares of the bankingsystem and raising those ofothers. Finally,a fourth set of forcescenters about the role ofgovernment and the statethe developmentof new forms ofgovernment insurance, ofnew types ofgovernment banking, and,quantitatively most important,the creationthrough the federal debt offixed debt intangiblesthat enter theholdings of financialintermediaries ingreat quantities. Onecan see clearly the reflection ofthese forces inthe sustainedor rising share of fixed debt in thetotal of long-termor of all intangibles, inthe supply to financialintermediaries ofa safe if lowreturn invest- mentwithconsequences for both theshares of intermediaries in thevarious countrysidetotals of assetsand the structureof the intermediarysystem in the distributionof assetsamong the several groups.
The explanatorycomments aboveare tentative andcursory. More light aridinformationcan be securedin Dr. Goldsmiths paper, and more deeplyreaching analysiswill, it is hoped,be pos- sible in themonograpi. Thepurpose here is merelyto arouse the curiosity andinterest of thereader and toprovide him withsome
12ets clues that, however superficial, might serve him as preliminary
he guides to the abundance of data in the paper.
he Two concluding comments are, perhaps, in order. The first is
1ie the high probability of interrelationship among the various groups
tal of factors operating. Even the incomplete list above clearly sug-
in gests that the events o the recent decade, in putting greater re-
n- sponsibulities on government, contributed at the same time to the
ill increased share of government insurance, to the enormous rise
ly in the total of fixed debt, and to the decline in the income shares
in of upper income groups. The resulting trends, some of which
ii were observed in Tables A and B, weretherefore directly inter-
i- related. And this still does not take account of the more indirect
in ties - influences of war-produced inflation and other disturbances
on the flow and channeling of savings in general and ontheir flow
in through financial intermediaries in particular. The task of analy-
th sis, as well as of statistical testing, must take into account interre-
ft lations among underlying forces and interconnections of the re-
r- siil ting trends.
Second, as always in trying to account for some series of histori-
rs cal events, there will l)e no dearth of explanations, particularly
f if we are satisfied by the rather vague semantics of "factors,"
"forces," and ''trends'' without defining them to the point of
11 being able to observe, measure, and test what it is that we call by
s these suggestive names. This comment applies just as much to this
y somewhat general discussion as to many other examples of what
f might be called implicit generalizing. The much more difficult
and much more satisfying task involves pinning down these van-
ahies, defining them in terms in which their size and impact can
be measured - without sacrificing thereby analytic validity. For
e this task the wealth of detail in Dr. Goldsmith's paper is indis-
penisable, although it may still be found far from sufficient. Never-
theless, the greater detail in distinguishing the types of financial
intermediaries; the kind of assets they hold; the periods of time
over which changes can he observed - are allvaluable precisely
because they reveal a greater variety of historical experience,
permit finer comparisons, and hence make it possible for the
analyst to define his hypothesis more specifically and test it more
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closely. The purely informationalvalue of Dr. Goldsmith'spaper,
resting in part andbuilding upon the vast statist i(al work in hi5
study of savings, is patent indeed. Butfrom the Standpoint ofthis
inquiry, and of economic kno'ledge in general, the weaving o
this dctail into a series of tenable hypotheses concerning the Inter-
related processes of capital formation and fiilaflciiig and economic
growth in the country would be even more important. It was the
major purpose of this introduction to suggest the high potential
value of Dr. Goldsmith's estimates to this broader task, to which




The usual ratio of the assets of financialintermediaries to
national wealth is not an appropriate measure becausethe numera-
tor is a gross unconsolidated conceptand the denominator, a
net consolidated figure.1 In order tofind a meaningful magnitude
with which to compare total assets of financialintermediaries, it is
necessary to prepare a nationalbalance sheet on an unconsolidated
basis. This permits derivation of a ratio between twocommensur-
able quantities, total combined (unconsolidated) assetsof finan-
cial intermediaries and of all economicunits within the nation.
The share of financial intermediaries innational assets has
increased considerably from about one-eighthin 1900 to one-sixth
in 1929 and to one-fourth in 1945. Thetrend has been reversed
during the last few years: the total assets offinancial intermediaries
have grown but slowly, while the current valueof national assets
has risen substantially under the influenceof a sharp increase in
the price level of tangible assets. As aresult the share of financial
intermediaries in national assets at the presenttime is slightly over
one-fifth.
The more familiar ratio of financialintermediaries' assets to
national wealth shoivs movements in the samedirection, but on a
higher level and of greater steepness. Itrises from fully one-fifth
in 1900 to over one-third in 1929, increasesfurther to approxi-
For the purposes of this study, financialintermediaries include the banking
system, private and government insurance andpension funds, savings and loan
associations, personal trust departments of banks and trustcompanies, government
lending institutions, and a number of other groups of smallersize. For brief defini-
tions of national wealth and national assets see p. 2.
15mately two-thirds in 1945, but falls hack to aboutone-half in 1949.
3. The share of financial intermediaries differsgreatly as be-
tween types of assets. It is very high- accounting in 1949 for 70
per cent or more of the total - for corporate bonds,state and local
government bonds, nIoitgagcs, am! Ijititeci Statesgovernrne . curities. The share isstill const(!crable- about two-fift}5for preferred stock and non-mortgage loans:modest - aboutone-
fifth -- for common stock; and negligiblefor tangibleassets.
4. The share of financial intermedmarics hasincreased consjder
ably between 1900 and 1949 for alltypes of assets excepttangibles. The rise has been most pronounced in thecase of corporate bonds
and stocks. It has been much less markedin mortgage andnon
mortgage loans and has been negligiblein the case ofgoverflme securities where theproportion was already very highin 1900. The most importantaspect of these movements Piobablyis the marked increase in the roleof financial intermediariesin the long-term external financingof businessenterprises.
5. As a result of considerabledifferences in the rate ofgrowth of the various types of financialintermediaries during thelast fifty years, the share of commercial andsavings banks in thetotal assets of all intermediaries hasdeclined fromapproximately two-thirds to two-fifths, while that ofinsurance organizationshas risen from
one-eighth to one-fourth. Asecond importantchange is the in- cm-easing share of publiclyowned financialintermediaries from only 2 per centup to 1929 to 13per cent in 1949 even ifthe Fed- eral Reserve banksare excluded
6. Marked changeshave occurred inthe compositionof assets held by financialintermediaries Thesechanges have beendomi- nated by the rise inthe proportionof total assetsconsisting of United Statesgovernment securities, fromonly a fewper cent up to World War Ito over 40 percent in 1949. Therelative irnpor- tance of holdings ofcorporate stock andconsumer loans has like- wise showna tendency to increase,although irregularlyand as a rule slowly.Virtually allother assets havelost in relative impor- tance, the dcchinein the sharein totalassets being particularly pronounced fornon-mortgage businessloans, state andlocal gov- ernment securities,corporate bonds, andtangible assets.
16